between or among nation-states (not domestic politics) that decides how one nation-state reacts to the others (McCormick 2010: 102) .
Realists stress the constraints placed on politics by human nature and the state of anarchy in the international system. The combination of these two factors makes international relations a domain full of power and interest.
Morgenthau, a leading theorist of realism, once emphasized that "human nature has not changed since the days of classical antiquity" (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 17) . In the realist view, human nature is basically egotistical, and therefore is prone to immorality. This had been put forth by Machiavelli, in politics "it must be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers" (Machiavelli 1979 ). According to the realist approach, morality in the realm of foreign affairs is fundamentally decided by what is good for the nation-state and its position in world politics. Thus, foreign policy in the realist view is full of conflicts. Nation-states do the maximum to protect and foster their own interests and watch the other nation-states' activities with wariness. Power politics become dominant in global politics because the key concerns of every nation-state are the distribution of power and the maximization of its own power.
The Nixon administration's foreign policy was more realist in its approach than that of previous presidents (McCormick 2010: 103) . It was built on the balance of power among the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Western Europe and Japan. The goal was to make the United States reduce the cost of global hegemony and make use of a large amount of regional power to further U.S. interests. In this way, the United States would sustain its predominance in world politics. Especially, the politics of Nixon influenced the process of Western European integration and made crucial decisions with respect to the war in Vietnam, détente with the Soviet Union and the opening towards China. Together, they made the Nixon administration build a distinctive foreign policy with new focuses.
The difference in the Nixon administration's foreign policy was clearly stated in its first State of the Union on 18 February 1970, which was selfreflected by President Nixon as "more than a record of one year. It is this Administration's statement of a new approach to foreign policy to match a new era of international relations" (Nixon 1970 ). President Nixon and his administration judged that building a long lasting peace needs a foreign policy guided by three fundamental principles:
"--Peace requires partnership. Its obligations, like its benefits, must be shared. This concept of partnership guides our relations with all friendly nations.
--Peace requires strength. So long as there are those who would threaten our vital interests and those of our allies with military force, we must be strong. American weakness could tempt would-be aggressors to make dangerous miscalculations. At the same time, our own strength is important only in relation to the strength of others. We -like others -must place high priority on enhancing our security through cooperative arms control.
--Peace requires a willingness to negotiate. All nations -and we are no exception -have important national interests to protect.
But the most fundamental interest of all nations lies in building the structure of peace. In partnership with our allies, secure in our own strength, we will seek those areas in which we can agree among ourselves and with others to accommodate conflicts and overcome rivalries. We are working toward the day when all nations will have a stake in peace, and will therefore be partners in its maintenance" (Nixon 1970 ).
These three principles implied that the United States would reduce its global responsibility and engage other states to share the burden of preserving the world order. This new approach to foreign policy also implied that the Nixon administration would defend U.S. interests by using its military power.
In addition, it implied that the United States would prefer negotiations as the policy of choice in dealing with various international issues. In general, this U.S. foreign policy was to a large extent different from that in the postwar administrations which placed much emphasis on U.S. ability and responsibility to carry the burden for building a "Free World" (Fousek 2000: 130) . Richard Nixon took office during an unusually fluid time in global politics: The economies of Western Europe, Japan, and China, ruined by World War II, had recovered fast in the late sixties. With the emergence of new economic powers and centers, the bipolar power structure of the postwar era, dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, had been replaced by a multi-polar world. Even though the United States was still the most powerful state in the world, the relations with the Soviet Union and China, and the Vietnam War had shown the limits of its strengths.
The grand strategy, developed by President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to adjust U.S. foreign policy to the new multi-polar system was deeply rooted in realism. The core of this strategy was to expect U.S. allies to pay for their own military defense, though the United States remained willing to aid in defense if necessary. The Nixon administration desired to pursue peace through sustaining a partnership with U.S. allies: "First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense" (Nixon 1969 ).
This realist response to the new situation actually reflected their strategic goal: the balance of power.
Richard Nixon was considered as a President who arrived at the White
House with more knowledge of foreign affairs than previous ones. He once stated clearly: "I've always thought this country could run itself domestically without a president. All you need is a competent cabinet to run the country at home. You need a president for foreign policy; no secretary of state is really important; the president makes foreign policy" (Small 1999: 59) . In reality, foreign policy drew his attention the most during his presidency (Hoff 1994: 4) .
Confronting the global developments of the late 1960s, President Nixon and his administration designed a new foreign policy approach for the United States based on the principles of the balance of power. Though global politics of the late 1960s was typically described as a rigid, bipolar period with an international system split into two hostile blocs, the Nixon administration saw the emergence of new powers: Japan, China and Western Europe. In addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, these would-be powers would escalate the changing contour of world order. A pentagonal balance would characterize the global political, economic and military structure as President Nixon indicated:
"…as we look ahead 5, 10, and perhaps 15 years, we see five great economic superpowers: the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, mainland China, and, of course, Japan…. These are the five that will determine the economic future and, because economic power will be the key to other kinds of power, the future of the world in other ways in the last third of the century."
This vision of a future world order inspired the Nixon administration to encourage the development of a balance of power in the modern world through U.S. détente with the Soviet Union, the normalization of political relations with China and more evenhanded relations with Japan and Western Europe. President Nixon explicitly explained the views of his administration's foreign policy as follows:
"We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended period of peace is when there has been a balance of power. It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor that the danger of war arises. So I believe in a world in which the United States is powerful: I think it will be a safer world and better if we have a strong healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance" (In an interview published in Time magazine on 3 January 1972). "We must strive for equilibrium of power, but we must move beyond it to promote the habits of mutual restraint, a coexistence, and, ultimately, cooperation. We must stabilize a new international order in a vastly dangerous environment, but our ultimate goal must be to transform ideological conflict into constructive participation in building a better world" (Kissinger 1976 ).
With such a realist approach to foreign policy, the Nixon administration (Gaddis 1982: 282) . The Nixon administration's definition of threats was fundamentally based on an enemy's actions. In a White House press briefing on 18 December 1969, Kissinger stated that: "We have always made it clear that we have no permanent enemies and that we will judge other countries, including Communist countries, and specifically countries like Communist China, on the basis of their actions and not on the basis of their domestic ideology" (Kissinger 1979: 192) . Implicitly, the Nixon administration claimed that the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union had two different ideologies, capitalism and communism respectively, did not constitute a threat to Washington. However, the combination of both hostility and capability embedded in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was threatening to the U.S.
Along with a change in understanding what constituted a threat, the Nixon administration reshaped the relationship between threats and interests. In the preceding administrations, perceived threats would define policy interests, particularly the threats from communism. Henceforth, containment of communism had become an interest in and of itself without considering "the precise way in which communism as a unified force might endanger American security" (Gaddis 1982: 105) 
Foreign policy made at the White House
Bureaucratic resistance has been what U.S. Presidents have to overcome to achieve their desired policy. Even if there is no resistance from bureaucratic bodies, the process of implementing policies is likely to produce outcomes which are not the same as a President's policy preferences. As a result, U.S. Presidents tend to employ administrative strategies to exert an impact on the making and implementation of foreign policy.
During his term in office, President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger were the leading figures in the making of U.S. foreign policy.
In his memoirs, Nixon recalled: "From the outset of my administration… I planned to direct foreign policy from the White House. Therefore, I
regarded my choice of a National Security Advisor as crucial" (Nixon 1990: 349) . Should there be any uncertainty as to Presidential or interdepartmental interest, it will be resolved in favor of clearance.
Official communications: All official communications with policy
implications must be cleared by the White House. When in doubt, the rule is that messages will be so cleared. This procedure requires close and confidential staff relationships at all levels between the White House and your Department as well as among Departments."
In the realm of foreign affairs, President Nixon fundamentally based his approach on presidential control. He developed a strategic approach to an administrative presidency which allowed the President to have a powerful role in the supervision of bureaucracy, which was necessary in order to achieve his foreign policy goals. He made a clear statement: "If we were to establish a new foreign policy for the era to come, we had to begin with a basic restructuring of the process by which policy is made" (Nixon 1970 ).
Accordingly, the power of cabinet members decreased and the power of Nixon's most trusted advisor Henry Kissinger increased. In reality, Henry
Kissinger became one of the most powerful men in Washington. Kissinger's offices were set up in the West Wing's basement, "from which he could have easy access to the President" (Dallek 2007: 100) . This is also what Richard Helms observed: "they alone would conceive, command, and control clandestine operations. Covert action and espionage could be tools fitted for their personal use. Nixon used them to build a political fortress at the White House" (Weiner 2007: 293) . Such a centralization of policy making and implementation enabled President Nixon and Kissinger to obtain their policy preferences because they would not have to go through a decision making process with many departments and agencies, and thus they could limit opposition. (Cline 1976: 216) .
According to Cline, Helms and the CIA were employed mainly "as an instrument for the execution of White House wishes" (Cline 1976: 216) .
It is noticeable that Gaddis pointed out that the centralization of policy making and its implementation were crucial in order to attain the Nixon administration's foreign policy agenda. This they accomplished "to a National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger also showed U.S. encouragement for deeper integration in the European Community when he stressed that: "'Efforts to create a more coherent European voice in our NATO are in net interest'. Kissinger even wrote to President Nixon about European coherence 'European coherence would be quite consistent with what you have said about the desirability over the longer run of our being able to deal with Europe as a true and more equal partner'" (Kissinger 1979: 385) . This U.S. perspective of the integration process in the European Community was clearly summarized in Nixon's Report to Congress on 18 February: "We favor a definition by Western Europe of a distinct identity, for the sake of its own continued vitality and independence of spirit. Our support for the strengthening and broadening of the European Community has not diminished. We recognize that our interests will necessarily be affected by Europe's evolution, and we may have to make sacrifices in the common interest.
A vision of European integration
We consider that the possible economic price of a truly unified Europe is outweighed by the gain in the political vitality of the West as a whole" (Nixon 1970 ). "In Western Europe, we have shifted from predominance to partnership with our allies. Our ties with Western Europe are central to the structure of peace because its nations are rich in tradition and experience, strong economically, vigorous in diplomacy and culture; they are in a position to take a major part in building a world of peace…Our ties were strengthened on my second trip to Europe this summer" ( Doc 85, FRUS 1969 ).
Yet, it is undeniable that U.S. policy towards European unity under the Nixon administration was mainly shaped by the fear that a strong and independent European Community would not be conductive to a healthy Atlantic alliance and to a strong partnership between the United States and Western Europe. This was underlined in President Nixon's statement: "The structure of Western Europe itself -the organization of its unity -is fundamentally the concern of the Europeans. We cannot unify Europe and we do not believe that there is only one road to that goal. When the United States in previous Administrations turned into an ardent advocate, it harmed rather than help progress" (Nixon 1970 ).
The ambivalence that the European Community would be likely to emerge into a counterweight to the U.S. was greater with the development of we had taken such pride in our leadership of the alliance that we forgot how much even the origin and success of the Marshall Plan grew from European ideas and European efforts as well as our own.
After 20 years, the economic prostration, military weakness, and political instability in postwar Europe that had required a predominant American effort were things of the past. Our common success in rebuilding Western Europe had restored our allies to their proper strength and status. It was time that our own leadership, in its substance and its manner, took account of this fact" (Nixon 1970 ).
In the course of reaffirming America's commitment to partnership with Europe, the Nixon Administration placed a concentration on (i) the U.S. "Out of this dynamic deal, our allies get not only the protection of our military power but some negotiated degree of participation in US political decisions that affect their destiny. By committing our resources and sharing our discretion in limited ways, we try to get our allies not only to do as much as possible for the common defense, but also to support our efforts to build a workable world order, especially by making sensible security arrangements with the Soviet Union" (Doc 4, FRUS 1969 . "Now the Europeans cannot have it both on the security front and then proceed to have confrontation and even ways. They cannot have the United States participation and cooperation on the security front and then proceed to have confrontation and even hostility on the economic and political fronts […] In the event that Congress gets the idea that we are going to be faced with economic confrontation and hostility from the Nine, you will find it almost impossible to get Congressional support for continued American presence at present levels on the security front […] we are not going to be faced with a situation where the Nine countries of Europe gang up against the United States -the United States which is their guarantee for security. That we cannot have" (Nixon 1974 ).
The strategic connections of economic, political and security interests were a crucial factor in Washington's approach to the European integration process. The Nixon administration was certain that the integrative process in Western Europe could not be smooth and achievable without U.S. military assistance. The threat of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Western Europe was, therefore, put on the negotiation table when the Europeans wanted to pursue a policy which in Washington's view harmed U.S.
interests. This was discussed by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger: "Nixon: And I am going to say too that this is all part of the same situation. The Europeans cannot expect cooperation on the security front where the American role is indispensible to their survival and confrontation and at times even hostility on the economic front.
Kissinger: And political front. That I think would be excellent." (Telcon Kissinger/Nixon 1974) Believing that without the U.S. military umbrella the European Community would be an economic giant but a military pygmy, the Nixon administration had a strong bargaining tool in its negotiations with the Europeans. The leaders of the European Community were made to understand that their economic and political integration process would be implemented successfully only if they continued to be supported from Washington on the security front. Other concerns must have also been on the mind of President Nixon when he spoke at a Cabinet-level meeting of the Council on International Economic Policy: "…have one hell of a time acting as a bloc. They do not get along with each other. The French don't get along with the Germans, the Germans don't get along with the British. It will be some time before they can learn to act as a group. This means we have to work with the heads of government in the various countries and not that jackass in the European Commission in Brussels" (Doc 100, FRUS 1969 .
Conclusion
With a strong interest in foreign policy, President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger steered the course of U.S. foreign policy making. They shared a well-defined perception of international politics and economics. Being led by realism, the Nixon-Kissinger team was aware of changes that were taking place in the world. The emergence of a new world order made them view the process of European integration somewhat differently from previous U.S. administrations. Though the United States during the Nixon presidential years still supported movements for integration in Western Europe, Washington could not hide its fear that a united Europe with increasing self-confidence and self-assertiveness could oppose U.S. interests. Therefore, European integration had to, in the Nixon-Kissinger view, take place under the influence of the U.S. The consultative mechanism allowed Washington to discuss issues before the European Community made important decisions. By keeping a security commitment to the European Community and by sustaining bilateral relations with the core nations of the Community, the Nixon administration not only maintained strong ties with Western Europe but also ensured that the European integration process would take into account Washington's interests.
